知識の目的は知ることである

> *知識の目的は知ることである。*
> *それを定義するには知識が必要だ。*
> *したがって、知識はすでに目的を果たしている。* 10月 2024 に、私はアリストテレスに帰属される引用を再び遭遇しました: 「知識の目的は行動であり、知識ではない。」 何かが根本的に間違っていると感じました. それは哲学の基礎に何かを主張しようとしており、考えている間にすぐにそれが真実ではないと気づきました. アリストテレスの *ニコマコス倫理学*（第 1 本、1095a）からの実際の引用は: 「目的は知識ではなく行動である。」 広く流布されているバージョンは誤引用です. 答えは単純なシーケンスから生まれた: 知識には命令がない。. 哲学の基礎における擬人化は混乱を生み、明確さをもたらさない。. その後、反射的ループが明らかになった: 知識を定義するには知識が必要だ。. それがすべてだ ― 完成は自らを知る中で起こる。. ## Why This Matters at Foundations When we treat a *state* (knowledge) as if it were an *agent* (with purposes, drives, imperatives), we get the ontology wrong at the foundation. This error propagates: 1. "Knowledge seeks truth" → attributes agency to a state 2. "Knowledge exists for action" → attributes agent purposes to knowledge 3. "Those who pursue knowledge without action are failing" → builds doctrine on the error But knowledge has no purposes to serve. Only agents have purposes. Knowledge simply *is* the state of knowing—completion through being what it is. **Getting this right matters:** If the foundation is clear—knowledge completes in knowing—then we can focus on what actually varies: *how agents pursue knowing*. The methods, the means, the ways people learn and come to understanding. The clarity doesn't diminish the importance of action, application, or methods. It reveals them for what they are: what *agents do* from the ground of knowing. With the foundation clear, we can have better conversations about the pursuit itself. **On certainty and confirmation:** When you know something, knowledge is complete for that knowing. Whether you're *certain* you know is a different question—that's about your confidence as an agent, not knowledge's nature. Certainty is knowing that you know, which presupposes knowing. Science confirms findings 100 times. That's method—agents pursuing certainty about whether they've achieved knowing. The confirmations serve the agent's need for justified belief. They don't complete knowledge; they help agents become certain they've achieved the state of knowing.